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Chapter 1
Risk assessment methodology for
critical infrastructure protection
1.1 Introduction
The EC Directive 114/08/EC ([1]) defines the concept of European critical infras-
tructure as an “asset, system or part thereof [...], which is essential for the maintenance
of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of peo-
ple, and the disruption of which would have a significant impact [...] as a result of the
failure to maintain those functions”. Critical infrastructures have slowly begun to be the
most significant technical systems influencing the social and economic life in all coun-
tries. Through the years, the vertically integrated systems, with only a few points of
communication, turned into complex horizontally integrated systems, with many points
of interaction in many of their dimensions ([2]). Moreover, the critical infrastructures can
be destroyed or disrupted by natural disasters, technical failures or deliberate acts of ter-
rorism. Concerns about the security of these systems resulted into a series of programmes
for their protection, such as the EPCIP. The high level objectives of such programmes
1
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is to increase the protection and lately the resilience of critical infrastructures against all
hazards. In the endeavour of this high level objective, several specific objectives have to
be achieved such as identifying systems’ vulnerabilities, interdependencies and evaluat-
ing impact. Development of specific case studies in order to validate methodologies and
tools in practice, measures to reduce vulnerabilities and increase resilience, establish best
practices are some of the elements that are usually part of these programs.
1.2 The EPCIP and risk assessment
As mentioned before, the EPCIP aims at improving the protection of critical infras-
tructures in Europe against all hazards. It has six pillars (see Figure 1.1), one of these is
the EPCIP Directive “on the identification and designation of European critical infrastruc-
tures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection”. The specific programme
“CIPS” is the financial instrument of EPCIP through which research projects and JRC ac-
tivities have been financed. JRC has carried out several research projects but it has also
supported the implementation (e.g. [3]) and the review process of the EPCIP Directive.
Figure 1.1: The EPCIP structure
Within the Directive text, risk assessment can be identified as an important element.
2
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It is mentioned several times for different purposes: As an obligation of MS to report
on risks, threats and vulnerabilities in the particular sectors as well as an obligation for
risk assessment within the framework of OSP (Operator Security Plans, a model of such
operator plan can be found here). Clearly elements of risk assessment methodologies can
be identified in OSPs.
Risk assessment methodologies applied by the operators are clearly sectorial or
even focused to particular assets. Methodologies such as fault tree analyses [4] are a
clear example of this approach. In addition, methodologies applied by operators are not
particularly influenced by the Directive. The majority of operators had already certain
methodologies in place in order to support their daily business. However, it is not clear
whether these methodologies can serve the purpose of the Directive that is the increase
of protection of critical infrastructures in order to reduce the impact to the economy and
society.
JRC has supported both the first phase of the application and implementation of the
Directive as well as the review phase. During this phase, the debate on risk assessment
for CI has been reanimated. JRC responded to this need in several ways among which
drafting a technical report for reviewing existing methodologies, identify the gaps and
propose new approaches. More information can be found in([5]).
1.3 Systems of Systems and risk assessment
As mentioned before, the state of the art in risk assessment for CI is mostly sectorial
and asset based. We just mention here the work of Sole et al. [6] for physical network
modelling as well as the work of Trucco ([7]) in economics. For more information on risk
assessment methodologies refer to the work of [2], [8] and [9].
The work on risk assessment for interconnected infrastructures or in other words
3
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SoS (Systems of Systems) is rather limited. To this end Carcano et al. and Eusgeld et
al. ([10], [11]), have focused on the System of Systems character of the interconnected
critical infrastructures ([12]). Researchers have pursued two main directions for the in-
vestigation of the critical infrastructures behaviour ([2]):
a) The study, analysis and understanding of the infrastructures current makeup. Based on
the understanding of the current status, insight into the operation of an infrastructure
is gained through various methods for the vulnerability, risk and/or threat assessment.
The drawback of this approach is that offers a clear picture only for the events that took
place in the past. Although many of the possible roots for failure are detected, not all
consequences are visibly perceived and understood.
b) Understanding the dynamic behaviour of the infrastructure systems. In this approach,
all possible paths and any cause for instability are explored. The drawbacks of this
method are the increased number of paths that have to be considered, as well as the
fact that many of the failures are of low probability-high impact nature.
The above mentioned qualitative approach provides only an indication of the system’s
behaviour but lacks the capacity to obtain tangible output. In order to perform this, two
approaches are identified ([2]):
a) Simulation of the critical infrastructure system behaviour using mathematical models.
The great advantage of this approach is the increased accuracy and preciseness of the
models. However, as the complexity of the system grows, a suitable mathematical
representation of the systems becomes a difficult task to be achieved.
b) Analysis of the aggregated behaviour of smaller interacting models. The behaviour
of a set of infrastructure is studied through a multi-agent system, where each of the
agents represents an infrastructure or an infrastructure system or asset. The collective
4
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behaviour of all these agents within an integrated environment allows the analysis of
the infrastructure system response to disruptive events.
These approaches provide the main elements that are necessary in order to build
risk assessment methodologies for interdependent critical infrastructures. Considering
also the main conclusions of the review on risk assessment methodologies [5] it has been
possible to gather all the necessary elements in order to proceed towards a comprehensive
methodology keeping in mind that we need to render these methodologies more adequate
to policy makers, operators and relevant public authorities. This can be achieved on the
basis of reducing complexity and implement a higher level of abstraction. The details of
the proposed methodology and implementation can be found in the following paragraphs.
1.4 A proposal for a risk assessment concept for networked
critical infrastructures
The methodology proposed here focuses on the impact and cascading effects of a
disruptive event without performing detailed analysis on each infrastructure asset. This
affords a certain level of abstraction that is still reasonable for obtaining a valid repre-
sentation of the infrastructure and the dynamics of the event being considered. Previous
work performed in JRC ([13]), adopted a similar systemic approach for CI disruption
and identified three layers of analysis: the micro level (links and nodes), the meso level
(network) and the macro level (territory). All these layers are covered with the proposed
methodology.
In Figure 1.2 we provide a schematic representation of this risk assessment method-
ology.
The proposed methodology starts from asset analysis (e.g. a power station), in-
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Figure 1.2: Schematic representation of the risk assessment methodology
vestigates the failure propagation to a critical infrastructure network (e.g. the grid), the
cascading effects on networks of interdependent infrastructures and finally estimates the
total economic impact due to this disruption. In the following chapters the elements and
the models that have been developed for the implementation of this approach are explained
in detail.
Concerning the implementation of this methodology we consider that is composed
by two principal components, the modelling at technological level and the modelling at
6
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economical level. According to the authors knowledge is the first time that there is an ef-
fort to assess critical infrastructures using a combination of technological and economical
models. Following this terminology, it would be adequate to consider critical infrastruc-
tures as complex techno-economical systems. In addition, we consider that the modelling
approach that we have adopted here simplifies the amount of data that is necessary for
performing the analysis. This will be further explained in the chapter that describes the
technological modelling.
A critical element of the present approach is the link between resilience assessment
and risk assessment. According to the established terminology, risk assessment is a func-
tion of events likelihood, vulnerability and impact. When it comes to resilience it is nec-
essary to have tools in place that may assess the behaviour of complex systems in terms
of propagation of failure and recovery. Clearly this goes a step further with respect to
typical risk assessment. If we consider risk assessment as indispensable for building risk
barriers into assets of critical infrastructures that can be applied also to large scale systems
by introducing the element of interdependencies, the resilience paradigm is necessary in
order to evaluate the dynamic behaviour and stability of a system.
The methodology that we present here will be further improved and federated with
the work on resilience that is taking place in parallel. Elements of this work can be found
in [14] and [15]. According to the authors view, resilience is a wider concept that cov-
ers much more than a simple risk assessment approach. It incorporates all the measures
that have to be applied to critical infrastructures in order to reassure that can withstand a
shock, bounce back and recover in case of a disruptive event. The concept of resilience
is applicable to assets of critical infrastructures, networks of critical infrastructures and at
an even higher level, Systems of Systems. However, the real added value of the resilience
paradigm is clearly shown when it comes to networks of critical infrastructures. At this
level the kind and diversity of threats, the cascading effects and the complexity of putting
risk barriers to complex networks require a different approach. An approach that is based
7
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mostly on the continuation of service and less on the risk reduction side.
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Chapter 2
Hierarchical technological modelling for
risk assessment of networked critical
infrastructures
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present the technological modelling of risk assessment for net-
worked critical infrastructures that is focused on the element of interdependencies. Nu-
merous methodologies exist in order to assess critical infrastructures at asset level. But
when it comes to networks of critical infrastructures a major gap exists. In this chapter
we will demonstrate the modelling approach that has been implemented in order to as-
sess the propagation of failure in a critical infrastructure and further on to interdependent
critical infrastructures. Thus at this point we consider intra-sectoral and cross-sectoral
interdependencies. An important parameter is that the proposed methodology considers
a high level of abstraction in terms of infrastructure representation. Clearly representing
networked infrastructures at the maximum level of detail is out of the scope due to enor-
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mous complexity, data requirements and also appropriateness of the output for a policy
maker.
2.2 A systems engineering approach for modelling inter-
dependent critical infrastructures
The methodology presented here aims to assess the impact on critical infrastructures
at system level. A key assumption is that the disruption of service takes place for a spe-
cific (or several) critical infrastructure asset (assets), it may cascade within the limits of
a critical infrastructure and then cascade to dependent and interdependent critical infras-
tructures. The final goal is to analyse interdependencies and the economic consequences
of infrastructure failure.
For this purpose, the systems engineering model is plugged to an IIM (inoperability
input-output model). The systems engineering component is applied to analyse perfor-
mance degradation and then the recovery of the disrupted system. Next, economic losses
are estimated with the IIM component that leverages information obtained from the SE
component of the model. However, dynamic phenomena taking place in a complex sys-
tem are often unpractical to model in a rigorous way. For instance, an electrical power
system is a large, integrated, interconnected and complex, dynamic, technical infrastruc-
ture. Such system can be subjected to various physical phenomena ranging from very fast
events such as transients due to lightening, to quite slow ones, such as for steam gener-
ators ([16]). Inevitably, this implies that such systems require some simplification. In
order to achieve this, the modelling approach proposed in this report focuses on the inter-
dependencies within sectors and across sectors, in other words on the interface between
infrastructures and components of infrastructures.
Using this approach the critical infrastructure is abstractly modelled as a network of
10
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nodes interconnected by links ([17], [18]). These modelling components are further ex-
plained in the following sections. A general representation of the technological modelling
approach is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Representation of the methodology at technological level for assessing critical
infrastructures disruption
2.3 Aggregation of assets and critical infrastructures
The nodes are the model representation of the critical infrastructure’s assets. The
role of the nodes is to produce, store, and/or to transform a specific type of resource that
characterises the critical infrastructure. The nodes, depicted with their suffixes in Figure
2.2, can be a sub-network in their own right, with nodes and links (Lij), where i is the
source node and j is the end node. Depending on the scope and goals of the modelling
procedure, different levels of abstraction of the network elements can be afforded. The
modeller is therefore free to decide the level of detail abstraction of the critical infrastruc-
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ture modelled structure. A node can represent an asset of a particular critical infrastruc-
ture, but, it can also represent a single critical infrastructure in an interconnected system of
critical infrastructures. Moreover, the user can consider the critical infrastructure system
of an entire country, a region inside one country, or even a region that comprises critical
infrastructures on the territory of several countries. Different levels of aggregation are
thus allowed.
Figure 2.2: Network representation of a critical infrastructure system
2.3.1 Critical infrastructure systems and modelling of interdepen-
dencies
The transmission lines that connect the aforementioned nodes represent the links of
the network and are a schematic representation of dependencies and interdependencies.
As already mentioned modern interconnected critical infrastructures can be considered as
SoS. A SoS is a combination of heterogeneous components that interact in various ways.
According to Rinaldi et al. [19], there are several types of interdependencies:
• Physical
12
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• Cyber
• Logical
• Geographic
Without much loss of generality we can safely assume that these interdependencies
can be grouped into functional (Cyber, Logical) and to topological (Physical, Geographic).
Functional dependencies can be defined as on-off dependencies (1 or 0). An example of
functional dependency can be the link between a power plant and a control centre. The
power plant needs information in order to be able to adjust accordingly its production.
Topological dependencies on the other hand are much easier to understand and visualise.
a) Topological dependencies - Refer to the physical/geographical location of the compo-
nent inside the system
b) Functional dependencies - based on the role of the component inside the system, and
relates to information about the system such as measures for protection, control, buffer-
ing, resilience, etc.
The main difficulty encountered when it comes to functional dependencies is to ob-
tain the necessary data. This can be obtained either through expert opinion or through
available data (this is mostly the case for the topological dependencies). Functional de-
pendencies will always require some kind of expert opinion, mainly due to their nature.
The present work on the systems engineering part indeed focuses on the functional de-
pendencies. However, topological dependencies are considered as well. Under certain
circumstances and using specific modelling techniques we can safely implement the con-
cept of functional dependencies to describe all kind of interdependencies. This would
allow the establishment of a harmonised framework for assessing interdependencies in
critical infrastructures and would be useful for policy makers. However, this is foreseen
as a future development of the present concept.
13
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2.3.2 Technological model implementation
The systems engineering model is developed as a federation of sub-models inte-
grated in a common platform, shown in Figure 2.1. Definitely a critical component of
this infrastructure is the GIS (Geographical Information System) component and the inte-
gration with MATLAB and SIMULINK. The GIS offers a friendly user interface through
which the user is able to provide the input data that are required in order to simulate the
behaviour of the system, as well as for the visualisation of the simulation results. On the
basis of this information, the system engineering model is automatically created using
MATLAB/SIMULINK.
Considering the intra-sctoral and cross-sectoral nature of modern critical infrastruc-
tures, the systems engineering model is developed in order to reflect this approach as
shown in Figure 2.1. The distinction between the sectoral and cross-sectoral interdepen-
dencies is mainly done due to the differences in the modelling approaches. At sectoral
level, interdependencies can be of all different kinds and the choice of available models is
huge. We mention for example the work of Bird et al. ([20]) on the conservation principle
of the resources of a system, high level architecture approaches by Eusgeld et al. ([11]),
agent-based models by Oliva et al. ([21]), system dynamics by Min et al. ([22]), etc. At
cross-sectoral level interdependencies are mainly functional.
2.3.3 Extraction of the topology of systems of infrastructures
The first step in the process to simulate the behaviour of networked systems is to
build the model on the basis of its topology. With the term topology we consider both
functional as well as topological connectivity of the various infrastructure elements. The
level of aggregation for every node depends on the user and the amount of data available.
Based on the information on the network topology (Figure 2.3(a)) and functional depen-
14
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dencies (Figure 2.3(b)), information on the structural properties of a specific node with
respect to other nodes (criticality, vulnerability, interdependency, interaction and coupling
coefficients, etc.) are determined. This allows for a further simplification of the network,
since the least affected nodes can be removed from the analysis. This work is part of
another report [23] and is linked to resilience assessment of critical infrastructures.
(a) (b)
Figure 2.3: Representation of a) network topology; b) functional dependencies in a criti-
cal infrastructure network
What is shown in Figures 2.3 is that both functional and topological dependen-
cies can be assigned in critical infrastructure networks. The topological dependencies are
clearly depicted through the GIS system but the user has the ability to assign an additional
layer of dependencies by creating links between the nodes of the network. Since this layer
of dependencies is purely functional it is subject to certain rules. The implementation of
such rules in the existing modelling approach will be the subject of future development.
At this stage this is done purely by the user and is based on expert judgement.
In order to demonstrate the importance of having both topological and functional
dependencies we have introduced a simple schema of a fictive network. A disturbance
that follows a disruptive event is injected into the system (Figure 2.4(a)). This disruptive
event may be for example an input from a tool such as RAPID-N [24], or any other tool
that may provide this kind of input. For example injecting the perturbation in Node 11, the
15
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(a) (b)
Figure 2.4: a) Disturbance injection and b) Network response
topological model shows only the (possible) propagation to the nodes connected by the red
links (topological dependencies). Taking into account the functional interdependencies,
Node 5 may also be affected, although this information is not depicted in the physical
topology. The consideration of both structural and functional interdependencies allows for
a better representation of the model behaviour, as presented in Figure 2.4(b). An example
of such infrastructure could be the electricity grid where the topological dependencies can
be represented by the grid topology while the communication layer can be provided by
the user in terms of functional dependencies.
The perturbation obtained at infrastructure level is the input for the assessment at
cross-sectoral level. The same methodology as explained before can be used for the rep-
resentation of the systems of critical infrastructures however a certain level of abstraction
is required in order to obtain reasonable complexity. Similarly to what was already men-
tioned, the cross-sectoral model determines the perturbation that the critical infrastructure
system suffers following a disturbance.
The implementation of the model is done using MATLAB/SIMULINK suite. This
suite has been chosen due to its ability to model the behaviour of such systems, as well
as its ability to connect to the PostGreSQL database used by the GIS platform in order to
import the topology and translate it automatically to a Simulink model. A simple network
16
Risk Assessment for Critical Infrastructures
of six nodes, shown in Figure 2.7(a) is presented here as a proof of concept.
2.4 Building the model in Simulink
Having selected the system and having available the required information on its
topology and behaviour, the network topology is extracted through the PostGreSQL database,
using either the Database Toolbox available in MATLAB, or MS Excel as intermediate.
The Database Toolbox is an extensive collection of toolboxes for use with MATLAB that
enables the import and export of data between MATLAB and relational databases ([25]).
This toolbox is preferred since it allows for an automated extraction process. In order to
proceed with the necessary operations in Matlab and Simulink it is necessary to translate
the topology extracted from the GIS system into mathematical representation. This is ob-
tained through the adjacency matrix. The adjacency matrix is automatically calculated
on the basis of the GIS information. For the purposes of the present analysis and due to
the fact that only functional dependencies are considered, the adjacency matrix values are
either 1 or 0. Obviously 1 represents a connection between two nodes.
Simulink is an excellent tool for simulating the performance of systems in the time
and frequency domain. It is based on building blocks that perform various mathematical
calculations but usually it requires the design of the system on a case by case basis. This
is not practical for the analysis of critical infrastructures. That is due to the dynamic na-
ture of critical infrastructure systems, the evolution of network topologies and the need to
assess situations that a failure of a component leads to the reconfiguration of the whole
network. For this reason we develop an automated procedure that is based on building
blocks. These building blocks represent the nodes of a system. Currently we assume a
standard behaviour for a node. According to this assumption if the node Nj (or nodes)
upon which node Ni depends fails (or fail) then the node Ni enters in failure mode fol-
lowing an exponential decay of its performance. The time constant of this exponential
17
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function defines the decay rate (failure time). Below a certain threshold value, it is con-
sidered that the node Ni has failed and it does not provide any services to the network
components that depend on node i. As a consequence the nodes that depend on node Ni
enter also in a failure mode and so forth.
The recovery of a node starts when the node (or nodes) upon which this node de-
pends is recovered, or if we consider that an external intervention brings this node back to
functional state. Again the recovery is simulated using an exponential function with the
time constant being the recovery time. Both buffering and recovery time for each node
are already introduced in the GIS layer for each node for the particular scenario to be
analysed. This information is thus already available.
The behaviour of each node of the system is represented by a block in Simulink as
shown in Figure 2.5(a). This is further elaborated to create the building block shown in
Figure 2.5(b). It is clear from this figure that an AND functionality exists in each node,
which means that the failure of one of the nodes upon which this node depends, triggers
the failure mode of the node concerned. The depiction in Figure 2.5(a) is for the case
of a node with only two inputs. This clearly depends on the GIS information and as
a consequence from the information in the adjacency matrix. The input connectivity is
modified accordingly in order to reflect the connectivity to more nodes. Finally a Matlab
function is implemented (see Figure 2.5(c)) in order to perform the threshold check for the
node state. This threshold is also inserted through the GIS system. The input parameters
that are required for performing the Simulink simulation are the following:
• The failure rate of a node i, fi
• The recovery rate of a node i, ri
• The threshold rate of a node i, thi
As future work, it is foreseen to offer the capability to define the behaviour of nodes
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through a drop-down menu of available functions within the GIS layer. The input require-
ments will be obviously modified accordingly.
An additional category of nodes is also implemented, the so called directly affected
nodes. In that case it is not necessary to simulate the performance of the node because its
behaviour is defined by the perturbation vector. In Simulink terminology this is translated
to a pulse generator that is linked to this node and it is used to inject a perturbation signal.
The Simulink model of the directly affected node (or nodes) is shown in Figure 2.6. Again
the connectivity of this Simulink block is defined by the adjacency matrix. For this reason
in 2.6 the node depicted has two outputs since two different nodes are connected to this
node (see below in Figure 2.8).
2.5 A proof of concept for a simplified System of Systems
In order to demonstrate the validity of the approach a simple case study with 6
nodes is simulated. For the purposes of this proof of concept we can safely assume that
each of these nodes represents a different infrastructure assuming thus an abstraction of
information at high level. The network topology as well as the necessary parameters for
each node is exported from the GIS system.
A disruptive event is simulated by injecting a perturbation (in the form of a step
function) to one of the system nodes. In the present example the perturbation is injected
in node 2. Node 1 that is directionally connected to node 2 is not considered any more in
the analysis since it is totally disconnected from the rest of the network. The failure time
tf defines the duration for which the node is considered to be in failure mode. In Simulink
this perturbation is inserted through the Pulse Generator block as shown in Figure 2.6 but
the perturbation value is inserted already through the GIS layer.
Once the model is finalized and the disturbance is injected into the directly affected
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(a)
(b)
(c)
Figure 2.5: SIMULINK model of the dependent node a) Behaviour model of the node
b) Connectivity model (subsystem1 is represented in Figure 2.5(a) ) c) Matlab code for
threshold check
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Figure 2.6: SIMULINK model of the directly affected node
node, the perturbation on the remaining nodes and the full network can be simulated by
choosing the duration of the event. The simulation results can be easily visualised using
plots of level of service versus time, as presented in Figure 2.9, or on the GIS system, as
shown in Figure 2.7(c) and 2.7(d). Moreover, the results can be saved in MS Excel files,
which can be easily accessed and used for further analysis by other systems.
The results presented in Figure 2.9 showed that, for the network analysed, the failure
of Node 2 (Figure 2.9(a)) would lead to a complete failure of the network (Figure 2.9(b)).
The values of the failure and recovery rates are set to the value of 1 time unit for all
the nodes, while the thresholds are set to the value of 0.5. The failure time of Node 2
is set to 2.5 time units. Although nodes, 3,4, and 5, respectively, manage to recover for
a short period of time (Figures 2.9(c) 2.9(e)), the failure and late recovery of Node 6
(Figure 2.9(f)) will ultimately lead to the complete failure of the critical infrastructure
network. Thus the network configuration and each node’s parameters are critical in order
to understand its dynamic behaviour in case of disruption. Furthermore this is the point
where the concept of resilience enters the stage. As future development of the present
work a resilience assessment module is foreseen to be plugged in.
To sum up, with this methodology and implementation tool it is possible to assess
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2.7: a) Extraction of topology from the GIS network; b) Disturbance injection into
the critical infrastructure network; c) Failure propagation in the critical infrastructure
network; d) Partial recovery of the critical infrastructure network
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Figure 2.8: SIMULINK model of the critical infrastructure network
the impact of a disruptive event on networks of critical infrastructures. This completes
an assessment at asset level (not shown in the present work) and actually the asset level
assessment can provide the input for defining the parameters for the perturbation to be
inserted in the affected node/infrastructure of the present model.
2.6 Conclusions and future work
In this chapter we provided an overview of the modelling approach that has been
applied in order to assess the behaviour of networks of critical infrastructures due to a
disruptive event. The methodology can be applied to assess both a sector or interdependent
sectors of critical infrastructures. It complements the various efforts that exist for the
assessment of risks at asset level with minimum data requirements which is critical for
policy makers that need a tool for having simulations in short periods of time. Clearly this
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Figure 2.9: Simulation results of the critical infrastructure network SIMULINK model: a)
Disturbance on the directly affected node; Response of the b) remaining network; c) Node
3; d) Node 4; e) Node 5; f) Node 6 to the failure of the directly affected node f)Reporting
and visualisation of the results
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methodology requires a certain level of information abstraction. Using the input from this
analysis, it is possible to assess the economic impact of critical infrastructures disruption
using the I/O modelling approach that is explained in the next chapter.
The information required by the system-engineering model, is dependent not only
on the type of critical infrastructure considered, but it could be as well a function of the
type of threat that causes the disruption. For this reason, the development of a library
of models for the systems behaviour based on these two categories is required and will
be consider for the future development of the present version of the model. Moreover,
the GIS will be able to automatically recognise the type of data required for each of the
plugged models and adapt the input fields accordingly. A further development of the
system-engineering model is the representation of the critical infrastructure behaviour
based on an inoperability input-output model ([26]) in order to expand its applicability
to systems with topological interdependencies that entail flows of goods in a continuous
way. It will be thus possible to model such systems at a high level of abstraction.
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Chapter 3
Economic modelling of critical
infrastructure disruption
3.1 Introduction
The disruption of critical infrastructures may have a significant impact at economic
level, especially for large scale infrastructures such as energy sector, telecommunications
sector, etc. The notion of economic impact of critical infrastructures is clearly mentioned
in the EPCIP Directive. The cross-cutting criteria refer to the economic impact of critical
infrastructure disruption as a means to verify the criticality of an infrastructure at Euro-
pean level. Thus it is clear that when it comes to risk assessment of critical infrastructures
the economic risk should be certainly considered.
The risk assessment methodology in the present work is focused on the economic
impact of critical infrastructure disruption. The high level objectives for the economic
impact component are the following:
• Quantify the effects caused by various events (all-hazards approach)
27
Risk Assessment for Critical Infrastructures
• Quantify indirect effects, so effects that cascade from one CI to the other due to
interdependencies
• Quantify effects resulting from failure of all kinds of infrastructures
• Regard the “workforce” as a CI
• Take into account the spatial dimension of the effects
• Incorporate elements of resilience
• Consider also effects on supply chains
• Consider a probabilistic approach
• Be applicable at European level (all 27 Member States).
A literature study ([27]) revealed that several methods for calculating the economic
impact of infrastructure service interruptions have been developed. This study has been
used for guidance in order to select the appropriate method for evaluating the economic
impact of critical infrastructure disruption. The conclusion of [27] was that I-O(Input-
Output) modelling is the most suitable. I-O models have been praised for its simplicity
and at the same time are criticised for their limitations. However, in recent years many
limitations of this type of models have been tackled. Nowadays, they have the ability to
include recovery dynamics and allow for probabilistic analyses, only to mention a few of
the past shortcomings for which this methodology has been heavily criticised.
3.1.1 The IIM
The type of I-O model chosen is an IIM model. It is derived fromWassily Leontiefs
I-O model of the economy ([28], [29]). The formulation of the original I-O model is given
in Equation 3.1, where xi represents the total production output of sector i. The technical
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coefficient aij represents the ratio of the input from sector i to sector j and the overall
production requirements of sector j. Finally ci indicates the final demand of the ith sector.
xi = aijxj + cj (3.1)
Taking this classic model as a starting point, Santos and Haimes ([30]) proposed the
demand-reduction IIM using the following formulation:
q = A⇤q + c⇤ (3.2)
Where q is the inoperability vector expressed in terms of relative loss. The elements
of the vector q represent the ratio of unrealized production with respect to the “as-planned”
production level of the industry sectors. A⇤ is the interdependency matrix that indicates
the degree of coupling of the industry sectors. The elements in a particular row of this ma-
trix (see Equation 3.3) indicate the amount of additional inoperability that is contributed
by a “column” industry to the “row” industry. xˆ is the production potential of industry i.
Finally, c⇤ is a demand-side perturbation vector expressed in terms of relative degraded
final demand.
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Equation 3.3 is rewritten as:
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q = (I   A⇤) 1 c⇤ (3.4)
Let us then define (I   A⇤) 1 as B⇤. Supposing that B⇤ exists (in mathematical
terms det(I A⇤) 1 6= 0), the elements bij of B⇤ represent the overall inoperability trans-
mission, i.e., the amount of the inoperability injected in the system by an external failure
c⇤ that is transmitted to the ith infrastructure taking into account first, second and higher
order dependencies. Note that this is different from the elements a⇤ij of matrix A⇤, which
only take into account direct influences. Finally, in order to estimate the economic losses
 x, the inoperability of sector i (qi) is multiplied with its corresponding “as-planned”
production (xi), which is:
 x = diag(q)x (3.5)
Where diag(q) is a diagonal matrix formed from q.
As a consequence, two metrics are produced by the IIM: inoperability (q) and eco-
nomic losses ( x ). The term inoperability connotes the level of a system’s dysfunction ex-
pressed as a percentage of its “as-planned” production capacity. The inoperability caused
by deliberate attacks, accidents or natural hazards can set of a chain of cascading impacts
on other interconnected systems. So, inoperability refers to normalised production loss
which can be defined as ([30]):
Normalized production loss =
“As-planned” production - Degraded production
Nominal production
(3.6)
Each element of the vector q falls between the interval [0, 1]. If an element of this
vector is 0, it means “business as usual” operation; if an element is 1, it implies that the
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corresponding industry is completely inoperable or fully incapable of production.
Economic losses can be defined as stock damage or flow losses (or business interruption
losses). In economics, flows refer to the services or outputs of stocks over time while
stocks refer to a quantity at a single point in time. Property damage represents a decline
in stock value and usually leads to a decrease in service flows. Flow losses originate only
in part from a company’s own property damage and can occur without the presence of
property damage [31]. Both, stock damage and flow effects can be of direct or indirect
nature. Direct effects are sustained by the sector that is hit by a particular hazard. Indirect
effects impact on sectors that are located in the close vicinity of the initially hit sector
(indirect stock damage) or that are dependent on the initially hit sector through supply
and demand relationships (indirect flow effects). Table 3.1 summarises the different types
of economic impact.
Table 3.1: Classification of economic impacts
Stock damage Flow effects/losses
Direct Property damage in hit sector Business interruptions in hit sector
Indirect Via hazardous material releases
from originally hit sector
Via suppliers/ customers relations
Input-Output (I-O) models, and thus also the IIM, ignore stock damages and only
take into account direct and indirect flow losses. Including both stock damages and flow
losses would result in double counting. The value of an asset, which, for example, could
be equipment pertaining to an infrastructure, is the discounted flow of net future returns
from its operation. So suppose that a machine with a 1-year lifespan is destroyed, and not
replaced for a year, then the economic loss is equal to either the value of a replacement
machine with a 1-year lifespan or the discounted flow of not produced output for one year
([32]).
Greenberg et al. ([33]) claim that the IIM is one of the ten most important accomplish-
ments in risk analysis in the past 30 years. The prove for this statement can be found in for
example, Crowther and Haimes ([34]), Barker and Haimes ([35], [36]), Lian and Haimes
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([37]) or Lian et al. ([38]). The next section is focused on the position of IIM analysis in
risk assessment.
3.1.2 The IIM and risk assessment
The IIM presents a perspective of interdependencies to calculate the cascading ef-
fects from a deliberate attack, natural disaster, or security measures. The flowchart in Fig-
ure 3.1 illustrates how these perspectives can be used in risk assessment. Direct impacts
(perturbations in the c⇤ vector) from sector risks are input to the IIM for interdependency
analysis. Jonkeren et al. ([39])1 demonstrate a good example of how the IIM can be
applied for risk assessment purposes. The study performs interdependency analysis for
an assessment of the total consequences to an EU Member State (Italy) resulting from a
disturbance to the power infrastructure. The IIM is fed by the systems engineering model
described in previous chapter. Once the probability of disturbances is known, in combi-
nation with the model output on economic losses, the risk which the infrastructure system
is subject to, can be determined.
3.1.3 The IIM and resilience: the DIIM
Because several applications of the static IIM have proven its feasibility for research
on economic consequences of Critical Infrastructure failure ([40], [41]), the model was
extended with the economic resilience aspect. In Rose ([42]) defines economic resilience
as the ability of an entity or system to maintain function when shocked. The first type of
resilience that was added to the IIM is restorative resilience or the speed of recovery after
a disruption (Haimes et al. [43]; [44]). Including this type of resilience changes the static
IIM into a DIIM (Dynamic IIM). Depending on the rate of recovery for economic sectors,
1A more recent version of this paper was submitted to the International Journal of Critical Infrastructure
Protection and is under review at the time of writing this report.
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Figure 3.1: IIM analysis in risk assessment process (Source: Crowther and Haimes,
2005)
inoperability levels and economic losses are estimated for each time period t (which can
be defined in days, weeks or months) and for each sector. Mathematically the model is
described in Equation 3.7.
q(t+ 1) = q(t) +K [c(t)  q(t) + Aq(t)] (3.7)
where K is the sector resilience matrix which has values between 0 and 1 on its
diagonal and zeros elsewhere. Each resilience coefficient ki in the matrixK is determined
by the nature of the individual sector itself as well as the controls on it via risk management
policies. Hardening of infrastructures and other risk mitigation efforts in the economic
sectors increase ki. Consequently, inoperability levels and economic losses are reduced
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with shorter recovery times.
A second type of economic resilience is “adaptive resilience” which refers to the
change in the speed of recovery of a sector during the recovery period. Recovery speed
could vary over time because recovery accelerates for example. This may happen when
the workforce available for repair works to destroyed gas pipelines in a particular region
increases with t. The values of kgas in the K matrix increase over time in this example.
The last type of resilience we explicitly take into account in our model is “absorptive
resilience” which is a measure for the buffering capacity of a sector. With the two previ-
ously mentioned types of resilience, the DIIM lacks the ability to capture risk management
strategies that maintain essential services, or delay the onset of inoperability. By combin-
ing the DIIM with the concept of “inventory”, absorptive resilience can be included in the
model. Inventory can be represented by finished goods or some other method by which
the infrastructures ability to provide goods or services to other infrastructures, sectors
and final consumers is maintained while the infrastructure is disrupted. For example, in-
ventory in the oil and gas sector could include excess stored gasoline ready for use, and
redundancies in the electric power sector, where energy cannot be stored, could include
back up generators that can provide some amount of total output to be maintained ([45]).
Inventory is included in the model by adding an extra variable to Equation 3.7. In order to
make this report not too technical the mathematical details of this extension are left out.
The resilience types described in this section are summarised in Figure 3.2.
In the Inventory-DIIM, Equation 3.7 is taken as a starting point and then extended
with two extra variables, namely the production inoperability pi(t) and the inventory level
Xi(t) (see Equation 3.8).
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Figure 3.2: Types of economic resilience.
qi(t+ 1) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
qi(t) + ki[c⇤i (t)  qi(t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t)] if Xi(t)   pi(t+ 1)xi(t+ 1)
max
8>><>>:
pi(t+ 1)  Xi(t+1)xi(t+1)
qi(t) + ki[c⇤i (t)  qi(t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t)]
if 0 < Xi(t) < pi(t+ 1)xi(t+ 1)
max
8>><>>:
pi(t+ 1)
qi(t) + ki[c⇤i (t)  qi(t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t)]
if Xi(t) = 0, Xi(t) > 0
qi(t) + ki[c⇤i (t)  qi(t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t)] if Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t) = 0
(3.8)
The production inoperability of sector i at the end of time t, describes inoperability
of the production process due only to a physical disturbance in that process. The inventory
level Xi(t) quantifies the amount of inventory in sector i remaining at the end of time t
([45]). Sector inoperability is initialised with Equation 3.9. The term Xi(t) describes the
total output anticipated to be produced by sector i between the end of time t 1 and the end
of time t. Naturally, if enough inventory is available to cover the output reduction caused
by the initial production inoperability, defined as pi(0)xi(0), then qi(0) = 0. If some
inventory is available, but not enough to cover the output reduction, sector inoperability
is a function of the fraction of inventory used to meet the output reduction. Finally, if
no inventory is available, the initial sector inoperability is brought about entirely by the
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physical production inoperability experienced by the sector.
qi(0) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if Xi(0)   pi(0)xi(0)
1  Xi(0)pi(0)xi(0) if 0 < Xi(0) < pi(0)xi(0)
pi(0) if Xi(0) = 0
(3.9)
3.1.4 Data required for the I-O model
The A⇤ matrices at the country level in the IIM are fed with I-O data provided
by the WIOD(World Input-Output Database)2. On April 16 2012 the World Input-Output
Database (WIOD) was opened for the general public. This database has been developed to
analyse the effects of globalisation on trade patterns, environmental pressures and socio-
economic development across a wide set of countries and can also be used for economic
loss analyses. The database covers 27 EU countries and 13 other major countries in the
world for the period from 1995 to 2009. The WIOD project is funded by the European
Commission, Research Directorate General as part of the 7th Framework Programme,
Theme 8: Socio-Economic Sciences and Humanities.
The WIOD national I-O tables consider 35 industries within an economy. Eight
of them can be identified as critical infrastructure industries and four as being a KRSC
(Key Resource Supply Chain) industry. Annual detailed enterprise statistics provided
by EUROSTAT (under de topic of “Structural Business Statistics”) allow us to perform
economic loss analyses on a more detailed industrial level than the I-O data allow us.
For example, these data enable us to assess economic losses for the electricity, gas or
water supply industry of an EU country instead of the aggregated “electricity, gas and
water supply” industry as considered in the a national I-O table from the WIOD. Table 3.2
provides an overview of the CI and KRSC industries considered in WIOD (where some
2See http://www.wiod.org/index.htm
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Table 3.2: CIs and KRSCs considered in the model
Aggregated (WIOD) Disaggregated
Critical Infrastructure industries Critical Infrastructure industries
Air transport Air transport
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply Electricity
Post &TLC Gas
Water transport Water
Land transport; transport via pipelines TLC
Financial intermediation, except insurance and pension funding Road
Health and social work Rail
Workforce Pipeline
Inland waterway transport
Key Resources Supply Chain industries Maritime transport
Food, beverages, tobacco Finance
Transport equipment Health
Wholesale trade Workforce
Retail trade
Key Resources Supply Chain industries
Food, beverages, tobacco
Automotive
Wholesale trade
Retail trade
are aggregated with others) and the industries after the disaggregation process. Assume,
for example, that due to some event the SE model estimates that the electricity industry in
Italy becomes inoperable for 40% and that we know on the basis of the detailed enterprise
statistics for Italy that the electricity industry is responsible for 75% of the output of
the “Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply” (WIOD) industry. So, we introduce
an inoperability of (0.75 ⇤ 0.40) = 0.30 into this WIOD industry. Hence, 0.30 is the
(starting) value for pelec(0) in Equation 3.9 in this example. Data on inventory levels is
also derived from the EUROSTAT annual detailed enterprise statistics via the “ratio of
stocks of finished products and work in progress to production value” per industry on the
country level. This ratio can be interpreted as the amount of inventory available relative to
the amount of production. A ratio of 0.5 for the “food, beverages and tobacco” industry in
Italy for example implies that there is enough inventory for a duration of 0.5t (half a days,
week or month) for this industry in this country. Note that for the electricity industry
for example, the ratio is likely to be close or equal to zero as it is impossible to store
electricity.
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3.1.5 Analysis on the regional level
In addition to the Member State level the SE-DIIM is also able to perform economic
loss analysis and risk assessments on a lower regional level. However, as the WIOD data
only enables us to estimate interdependencies on the national level, performing a spatially
explicit analysis requires the recalculation of A⇤. After all, intraregional interdependen-
cies are likely to differ from those on the national level. The regional interdependency
coefficients are generally estimated using regional multipliers that are constructed from
measures of regional production compared to the national ones. In our model, these mul-
tipliers are formulated from location quotients, which are ratios that represent the relative
production of a sector in a region compared to the nation (see Equation 3.10). Equation
3.11 describes the application of location quotients in estimating intraregional technical
coefficients. If industry i is less concentrated in the region than at national level (lqsi < 1),
it is seen as being less capable of satisfying regional demand with its output. However, if
industry i is more highly concentrated in the region than at national level (lqsi   1), then
it is assumed that the national input coefficients from industry i, a⇤ij , apply to the region,
and the regional surplus produced by i will be “exported” to the rest of the nation ([46]).
lqsi =
xsi/x
s
xNi /x
N
(3.10)
a⇤sij =
8>><>>:
lqsi a
⇤
ij, lq
s
i < 1,
a⇤ij, lq
s
i > 1,
(3.11)
where lqsi is the proportion of demand for sector i in region s that is satisfied internally
compared to other regions in the nation. xsi , xNi is the total production output of sector i in
region s or the nation N , respectively. xs, xN is the total production output of all sectors
in region s or nation N . a⇤sij is the amount of inoperability experienced in sector i due to
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total inoperability in sector j in region s. a⇤ij is the amount of inoperability experienced in
sector i due to total inoperability in sector j in the nation.
The location quotients are based on national and regional employment data provided
by EUROSTAT, which is a well-accepted proxy for output data. Note that the dimensions
of the regional A⇤s matrices are equal to the national A⇤ matrix. The individual entries of
the regional matrices have decreased in value or remained the same because each regional
matrix, belonging to the same country, is derived from the same national matrix and from
location quotients that are strictly between 0 and 1. Intuitively, the values should decrease,
because smaller regions are accounted for, and in this case, the degree of interconnected-
ness between sectors within the individual region decreases as well ([47]).
3.2 Conclusions and future work
At the moment the DIIMs that can be found in the literature assume that economic
recovery starts immediately after a disruption of an infrastructure occurs. However, it is
likely that in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, industries are not able to start recovery
activities because of several practical obstacles. A repair workforce may not be able to
reach damaged gas pipelines after an earthquake because the roads are damaged as well
for example. Hence, the SE-DIIM should be able to analyze an immediate post disaster
period in which there is no recovery (during the first few time periods e.g.) and in which
inoperability levels only deteriorate due to inoperability transmission. Figure 3.3 presents
the different post-disaster phases that should be distinguished. At t = 10 inoperability of
the CI is equal to zero again.
Equation 3.8 applies only to the phases 2 and 3. To be able to include phase 1
as well, Equation 3.8 needs to be extended with phase 1. Therefore we have rewritten
Equation 3.8 leaving out the recovery aspect (the K variable). The result can be seen in
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Figure 3.3: Different phases in post-disaster period
Equation 3.12. So, together Equation 3.8 and Equation 3.12 cover the three phases vi-
sualised in Figure 3.3 and we call the resulting model the Resilience-DIIM. In Equation
3.12, depending on the inventory situation, there are, like in Equation 3.8, four possible
scenarios (which are mutually exclusive) to determine inoperability for the next time pe-
riod. This future inoperability is equal to the maximum of (1) the level of inoperability in
the current time period plus any additional inoperability created by a loss of demand or
inoperability transmission, or (2) the production inoperability introduced in the next time
period.
qi(t+ 1) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
qi(t) + c⇤i (t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t) if Xi(t)   pi(t+ 1)xi(t+ 1)
max
8>><>>:
pi(t+ 1)  Xi(t+1)xi(t+1)
qi(t) + c⇤i (t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t)
if 0 < Xi(t) < pi(t+ 1)xi(t+ 1)
max
8>><>>:
pi(t+ 1)
qi(t) + c⇤i (t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t)
if Xi(t) = 0, Xi(t) > 0
qi(t) + c⇤i (t) +
nP
j=1
a⇤ijqj(t) if Xi(t+ 1) = Xi(t) = 0
(3.12)
Although the development of the model for the first post disaster phase is finished,
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a practical application of it does not exist yet. This is foreseen for the very next future.
In section 3.1.3 three types of economic resilience were presented. These resilience types
are all at the industry or sectoral level. However, because the amount of inoperability
transmission from one infrastructure to the other will be subject to changes in the post
disaster phase , there is a need to model resilience at the system or network level as well.
This can be achieved by allowing the aijs (the interdependencies) in the model, which
represent the amount of inoperability transmission between industries, to change over
time. The key challenge here, is to find a credible method which estimates how these aijs
should change. Setola et al. ([48]) offer an interesting approach here (which is further
developed in Oliva et al. ([49])). They estimate IIM parameters for infrastructures whose
size depends on the duration of the inoperability of the industries they depend on, using
fuzzy logic. They consider five time frames: 1 h, 1-6 h, 6-12 h, 12-24 h and 24-48 h
and they assume that there are no recovery activities during these first 48 hours after the
disaster event has occurred. So, 48 hours after the disaster event the interdependencies
are highest and inoperability transmission is strongest. Then, recovery is assumed to start.
What Setola et al. ([48]) do not address however, is what happens to the size of the
interdependencies once the recovery phase has started. It is likely that they start shrinking
again and at the moment when the system of CIs is fully recovered from the disaster (at
t = 10 in Figure 3.3) the A⇤ matrix is likely to be the same A⇤ matrix as the one at
t = 0. After all, the system is back in its old equilibrium state then. According to this
reasoning, it immediately follows that there should exist a relation between the rate of
recovery (K) and the change in interdependencies (A⇤). For us, to apply the fuzzy logic
methodology to estimate how interdependencies change over time, is time consuming and
costly, especially because we work with a larger system (the 35x35 A⇤ matrices WIOD
tables) than Setola et al. ([48]) who use an 11x11 system. We will therefore explore the
possibility of estimating functions for the change in interdependencies for the system of
CIs presented in Setola et al. ([48]) and use these functions for our set of CIs. Finally, the
original formulation of the Resilience-DIIM only allows for a single perturbation vector.
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In the future however, the DIIM is foreseen to be able to account for disturbances to
industries in the economy that are probabilistic, which implies to allow the Resilience-
DIIM to use a perturbation matrix as inputs to the model. This will result in inoperability
and economic loss matrices as being the output of the model. For an example of this
extension see [50].
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